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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES -
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND ABROGATES COM-
MON LAW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES AND DECLARES
STATUTORY DUTY OF A HUSBAND TO BE LIABLE FOR
NECESSARIES SUPPLIED TO HIS WIFE INVALID. Condore v.
Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Condore v. Prince George's County,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the necessaries doctrine, predicated upon a hus-
band's unilateral duty to support his wife,2 reflected a sex-based classi-
fication which is unconstitutional under the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA)3 and, therefore, is no longer part of the common law of Mary-
land. The court further indicated that article 45, section 21 of the
Married Women's Property Act,5 relating to a husband's liability for
his wife's necessaries, is invalid.6 Thus, neither husbands nor wives are
liable, absent an express or implied contract, for necessaries supplied to
the other. The strong dissent in Condore advocated an extension of
liability to credit-worthy spouses, thus protecting unemployed, home-
making spouses from liability for the other spouse's debts and yet en-
abling them to pledge their spouse's credit to obtain the necessities of
life.7 This casenote examines the rationale supporting the duty of
either spouse to be liable for necessaries supplied to the other and sug-
gests that the appropriate legislative response is an extension of that
obligation to both spouses.
II. THE FACTS
Mr. Condore was admitted as a patient in a county hospital.' Pur-
suant to regular admission procedures, the hospital provided a stan-
dard form which designated areas for both the signature of the patient
1. 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
2. Id at 531, 425 A.2d at 1019.
3. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 45. Article 45 of the Maryland Constitution,
Declaration of Rights states: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
abridged."
4. 289 Md. 516, 532, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981).
5. Section 21 provides:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to relieve the husband from
liability for the debts, contracts or engagements which the wife may in-
cur or enter into upon the credit of her husband or as his agent or for
necessaries for herself or for his or their children; but as to all such cases
his liability shall be or continue as at common law.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 21 (1980).
6. 289 Md. 516, 530, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981). Although the court of appeals
declared section 21 invalid, at trial, "[t]he matter of the constitutionality of the law
was not raised by demurrer or answer or by motion to strike by either party."
Brief for Appellant at 13 n.5, Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,
425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
7. 289 Md. 516, 541, 425 A.2d 1011, 1023-24 (1981) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
8. Id at 518, 425 A.2d at 1012.
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and the signature of the person responsible for the payment of hospital
charges. Mr. Condore did not place his signature on the line marked
for that of the patient but rather on the line assigned to the person
responsible for the payment of the charges.9 Although Mrs. Condore
did not sign this form, written reference was made on the form to her
place and length of employment.' °
Mr. Condore died while a patient in the hospital. His insurance
carrier paid for all hospital services except those which were recorded
on the hospital bill as having been rendered on dates after Mr. Con-
dore's death. The county sued his widow for the unpaid amount."
III. BACKGROUND
At common law, a husband's general duty to support his wife has
been described as both a moral obligation and a legal duty.' 2 This duty
is owed not only to the wife but also to the state under the rationale
that the wife should not become a public charge on the state treasury. '
3
One mechanism for enforcing the husband's duty is an action by a
creditor for necessaries furnished to the wife.14
While the United States Supreme Court, in Bowen v. Chase, ' im-
plicitly recognized a wife's right to procure necessaries, it has been the
state courts that have explicitly held that the wife, while cohabiting
9. Brief for Appellant, Record Extract at E. 12, Condore v. Prince George's County,
289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
10. Id
11. Id at E.3 1. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county after re-
jecting defendant-wife's challenge to the accuracy of the billing statement, ques-
tioning the fact that certain charges were made after the husband's death. The
court accepted the plaintiff's affidavit that posting on days after .the charge was
actually incurred was routine billing practice. The trial court held the wife liable
for her husband's medical expenses because women must accept the "burdens as
well as the benefits" of equality. Id at E.33.
12. Fry v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 289 F. 589, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (husband
normally bound to provide home for wife and cannot lay claim at law or in equity
for reimbursement from her); Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.
Vt. 1957) (widow's insurance benefits under Social Security Act stem from the
fact that husband is under a legal duty to support his wife).
13. Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 24, 27, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 432, 435 (1966).
14. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 189-92
(1968).
15. 94 U.S. 812 (1876). A trust created in order to give a married woman the separate
and exclusive use of land, free from control of her husband, was sustained with
the effect that the wife could use the rents and profits from the land as she should
"think fit, at her own free will and pleasure, and not subject to the control or
interference of her present or future husband." Id at 815. To merge that trust in
the legal estate would have had the effect of placing the property in the husband's
control by virtue of his marital rights, defeating the purpose of the trust.
In United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926), the Court explicitly com-
mented on the obligation of a husband to provide for his wife's necessaries as
incident to the marriage relation itself and distinguished this unique duty from
any obligations arising out of the concept of community property. Id at 317.
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with her husband, may bind him when she contracts for necessaries
with third persons. 6 Such liability is based on the concept of restitu-
tion' 7 and, frequently, the wife's ability to pay is considered
irrelevant. '8
Currently, liability is generally imposed on the husband not only
for basic needs such as food and shelter but also for things necessary
and suitable to the rank and condition of the wife and the style of life
adopted.' 9 State courts have recognized that medical expenses are to
be included within the purview of necessary expenses. 20 Furthermore,
the doctrine has served as a basis for recovery by the husband for his
wife's medical expenses when she was injured by a third party.2'
There are instances in which the wife is responsible for debts for
necessaries. Although at common law no duty has been placed upon
the wife for her husband's necessaries, some courts have held that equi-
table claims may be enforced against her estate if the husband is unable
to pay.22 Some states, such as California, have imposed liability for the
husband's necessaries by statute.23 Finally, when a wife uses her own
funds to pay for necessaries, she may compel reimbursement from the
husband only where he has promised such reimbursement, either ex-
pressly or by implication of fact or law.2 4 If it can be proven that the
wife pledged her own credit and not that of her husband, she will be
held solely liable.25
Early Maryland decisions followed the weight of authority regard-
ing the necessaries doctrine.26 The wife's right to support sprang from
16. Eg., Jones v. Gutman, 88 Md. 355, 364, 41 A. 792, 794 (1898).
17. Section 113 of the'Restatement of Restitution provides:
A person who has performed the noncontractual duty of another by sup-
plying a third person with necessaries which in violation of some other
duty the other had failed to supply, although acting without the other's
knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if
he acted unofficiously and with the intent to charge therefor.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 113 (1937).
18. Bennett v. Bennett, 27 III. App. 2d 24, 169 N.E.2d 172 (1960).
19. E.g., Leo v. Leo, 280 Ala. 9, 189 So. 2d 558 (1966); Evans v. Evans, 263 Ark. 291,
564 S.W.2d 505 (1978); Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Pinto, .88 Pa. Super. 72, 78, 145
A.2d 865, 869 (1959).
20. E.g., Heym v. Julasz, 45 Ohio App. 571, 68 N.E.2d 119 (1943).
21. Old Dominion Freight Line v. Martin, 153 Ga. App. 135, 264 S.E.2d 585 (1979);
Boland v. Morrel, 275 Minn. 496, 148 N.W.2d 143 (1967); Kenelia v. Glen Falls
Ins. Co., 171 N.J. Super. 144, 408 A.2d 144 (1979); Vaca v. Whitaker, 86 N.M. 79,
519 P.2d 315 (1974); Kohls v. Brak, 57 Wis. 2d 141, 203 N.W.2d 666 (1973).
22. Eg., Bowen v. Dougherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
23. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5121 (West Supp. 1981). Section 5121 provides:
The separate property of a spouse is liable for the debts of the
spouse contracted before or after the marriage of the spouse, but is not
liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted after marriage; pro-
vided, that separate property of the spouse is liable for the necessaries of
life.
24. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 Ohio App. 502, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938).
25. Charron v. Day, 288 Mass. 305, 117 N.E. 347 (1917).
26. Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24, 59 A. 139 (1904).
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the marital relation itself and not from her inability to support her-
self. 7 The wife could forfeit her right by deserting her husband. 28 In
such an instance, the wife's suppliers had to determine whether the
credit of the husband had been pledged. 29 Additionally, the General
Assembly enacted a series of statutes known as the Married Women's
Property Act.3° Section 5 of the Act provided that husbands were not
liable for contracts made by the wife in her own name. 3' However,
section 21 of the Act retained the husband's liability for the wife's con-
tracts for necessaries.32
Prior to the adoption of Maryland's ERA, the issue of whether a
wife is liable for her husband's medical bills was addressed in Rowe v.
Department of Mental Hygiene.33 There, the Department of Mental
Hygiene attempted to recover from a wife the cost of confining her hus-
band in a state hospital. The State argued that "unless marriage is a
unilateral contract, it imposes the same degree of responsibility upon a
wife to pay, if she has the ability to do so, as it does upon the hus-
band."' 31 The argument failed, however, because article III, section 43
of the Maryland Constitution protects the property of a wife from the
debts of her husband.35
In 1972, Maryland adopted the ERA. 6 Following its adoption,
the concept of the wife's unilateral rights was raised in several contexts
although it was not raised in light of the necessaries doctrine until Con-
dore. In Coleman v. State,37 the criminal statute enforcing the hus-
band's duty to support his wife was declared unconstitutional because
it offended Maryland's ERA.3 8 The legislature responded to Coleman
by extending the criminal prohibition against non-support to all
spouses. 39 The same year that Coleman was decided, the court of ap-
At common law, the legal existence and identity of the wife was
merged into that of the husband who became entitled to hold and to
reduce into his possession all her personal estate, and as a consequence
the law cast upon him the duty of supplying her with necessaries suitable
to their station in life.
Id at 30, 59 A. at 141.
27. McFerran v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 576, 113 A. 107, 108 (1921).
28. Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary Cas. Hosp., 210 Md. 375, 381, 123 A.2d 333, 338
(1956).
29. Id at 382, 123 A.2d at 338.
30. Law of April 9, 1898, ch. 457, §§ 1-20, 1898 Md. Laws 1085 (current version at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, §§ 1-21 (1980 & Supp. 1981)).
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (1980).
32. Id § 21.
33. 247 Md. 542, 233 A.2d 769 (1967).
34. Id at 546-47, 233 A.2d at 772.
35. MD. CONST. art. III, § 43.
36. Law of May 26, 1972, ch. 366, 1972 Md. Laws 1226 (ratified as MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTs art. 46).
37. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
38. Id at 329, 377 A.2d at 557.
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88 (Supp. 1981).
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peals in Rand v. Rand' also relied on the mandate of the ERA to ex-
tend the parental obligation of child support to both parents."' The
General Assembly likewise rendered the Maryland alimony statute
gender-neutral.42 But in Kline v. Ansell, 3 a criminal conversation case,
the court of appeals opted to void the property right of a husband in the
body of his wife rather than to extend a corresponding right to the
wife."
Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the effect of the pas-
sage of the ERA on the necessaries doctrine. In United States v.
O'Neill,45 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that a wife can be liable for the costs of necessaries
provided to her husband so long as it can be shown that she is capable
of bearing the financial burden.' In so holding, the court justified the
extension of liability by analogizing to Conway v. Dana47 in which the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted the ERA to mandate an
extension of liability for the necessaries of minor children to both
spouses.48
Two state courts have dealt squarely with the issue of whether,
after the passage of the ERA, a wife is liable for the necessaries of her
husband. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Jersey Shore Medical
Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Baum49 extended liability to wives who are
credit-worthy. The court in Jersey Shore did not impose liability on
homemaking wives who had established no credit in order to avoid
"equality with a vengeance."5 ° The court also held that income and
property of one spouse should not be exposed to satisfy debts incurred
by the other unless assets of the spouse who incurred the debt are insuf-
ficient, thereby holding the wife secondarily liable."'
The District Court of Appeals of Florida for the Second District,
40. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
41. The court in Rand held that the duty of both spouses was to be "in accordance
with their respective financial resources." Id at 517, 374 A.2d at 905.
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1 (1981) (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1973
& Supp. 1974)).
43. 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980).
44. Id at 593, 414 A.2d at 933. Maryland's position in Kline was contrary to that of
most other jurisdictions. 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 205, 207 (1980). Protection of the
sanctity of the marital relationship is most often cited as the justification for con-
tinued recognition of the tort. Id at 209.
45. 470 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
46. Id at 854.
47. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
48. Id at 539, 318 A.2d at 326.
49. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).
50. Id at 149, 417 A.2d at 1009.
51. Id at 146-48, 417 A.2d at 1008. Ultimately, the Jersey Shore court reiterated the
reasoning of Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), that women are no longer "destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family" and the Supreme Court's con-
clusion in Orr that "the common law has an inherent capacity to adapt to changes
such as the movement of married women toward economic equality." Id at 280.
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in Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 52 also held that
there was a gender-neutral burden of support. The court based its rea-
soning on the fact that the legislature had already imposed such a bur-
den by amending the state's divorce statute to provide that the court
could award alimony to either party. Contrary to Jersey Shore, how-
ever, the court in Manatee imposed liability regardless of whether the
wife was capable of bearing the burden.53
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING
In Condore v. Prince George's County, 54 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland noted that the necessaries doctrine is based on the husband's
entitlement to the wife's services and on the inability of the wife to
contract in her own name.55 The court also noted that, at common law,
the wife's property was subject to the claims of the husband's credi-
tors.56 The court then discussed the history of the Married Women's
Property Act, 7 which changed the common law." The court held,
however, that it could rely neither on the Act nor on Rowe v. Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene59 because the subsequent passage of the Mary-
land ERA mandated that such gender-based classifications are now
untenable.6" Thus, the court not only abrogated the common law doc-
trine of necessaries but also declared the statutory duty of the husband
to be liable for the wife's necessaries invalid.
The court rejected Jersey Shore's holding even though it adopted
its definition of a modem marriage as one of "interdependence."', It
reasoned that since the Maryland legislature failed to address the issue
effectively,62 it would not extend the duty to both spouses as that would
create a new cause of action where none existed before. The court indi-
cated that such a holding is consistent with Rand's extension of the
parental support obligation since there the mother was already secon-
darily liable for the child's support.63 Finally, Maryland's highest court
concluded that the ERA does not require either extension of the duty to
52. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
53. Id at 1359.
54. 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
55. fd at 521, 425 A.2d at 1013.
56. Id
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, §§ 1-21 (1980).
58. 289 Md. 516, 521-22, 425 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1981).
59. 247 Md. 542, 233 A.2d 769 (1967).
60. 289 Md. 516, 521-27, 425 A.2d 1011, 1015-19 (1981).
61. Id at 531, 425 A.2d at 1019.
62. Id at 532 n.8, 425 A.2d at 1019 n.8.
Amendments to art. III, § 43 of the Maryland Constitution were
proposed in 1974 and 1975 to insulate any "person" from liability for the
debts of that person's spouse and in 1976 to provide that "persons" are
liable for the debts of the spouses "only as to necessaries." None of these
proposed amendments was [sic] approved by the legislature.
Id
63. Id at 531, 425 A.2d at 1019.
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both spouses or curtailment of the duty of the husband. Rather than
create a new liability for the wife, the court indicated that a matter of
such fundamental policy should be resolved by the legislature.6'
The dissent challenged the majority's position on several points.65
According to Judge Rodowsky, the legislature had already indicated
that a wife has a duty to support her husband:
Because the willful failure of a wife to support her husband is
subject to criminal sanction, there is necessarily an underlying
duty of support running from a wife to her husband. Conse-
quently, a decision in the instant case to expand the doctrine
to embrace necessaries furnished the male spouse will not be
imposing a duty of support on the female spouse. The duty is
already there, at least by statute.66
A second reason given by the dissent for extending liability focuses
on the fact that such an extension would not automatically bind the
non-contracting spouse for necessaries supplied to the other.67 Rather,
liability depends on whether the credit of the non-contracting spouse
has been pledged.68 Judge Rodowsky argued thit the determination of
whose credit was pledged is a question for the fact finder.69 Such a
determination on the facts of each case, the dissent reasoned, would
protect those homemaking wives or husbands who had established no
credit because nonexistent credit could neither be pledged nor relied
upon by the supplier.7°
The dissenting opinion advocated following the lead of other
states, such as Florida and New Jersey, which have opted to extend
liability to both spouses. Furthermore, the dissent pointed out, the
Maryland General Assembly has already recognized the viability of the
necessaries doctrine in retail credit legislation adopted after the passage
of the state's ERA.7'
V. ANALYSIS: EXTENSION OR CURTAILMENT?
It appears that by adopting a view toward a modem marriage in
64. Id at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019.
65. Judge Rodowsky dissented with Judge Davidson concurring in part.
66. 289 Md. 516, 544, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 533, 425 A.2d at 1020 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 535, 425 A.2d at 1021 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). The majority ignored the
question of whose credit was pledged. Judge Rodowsky noted in Condore that the
husband's credit had been pledged since he signed on the "person responsible"
line rather than on the line provided for the patient's signature. Id at 539, 425
A.2d at 1023 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). In Condore, it is arguable that the
County Hospital did consider the wife's credit since information concerning her
place and length of employment was elicited. Id (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 540, 425 A.2d at 1023 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 541, 425 A.2d at 1024 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
71. Id (Rodowsky, J., dissenting); see MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-705(5) (Supp.
1981).
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which a financially non-contributing spouse is hardly envisioned, the
Condore court is removing from dependent spouses a protection that
fostered the interdependence of the family unit. The majority failed to
adopt Jersey Shore's reasoning that many but not all women have shed
their traditional dependence and that expenditures, even if incurred by
only one spouse, ultimately benefit the family unit.72
At least one commentator disagrees with the majority's philosophy
that courts should not resolve the issue: "As courts become increas-
ingly willing to invalidate laws on equal protection grounds, they will
have to re-formulate laws to make them nondiscriminatory. It is not
enough to find constitutional violations; the courts must determine the
effects of, and fashion remedies for, the constitutional defects."73 One
framework for determining whether to curtail or extend a statutory
right once it has been found unconstitutional includes an examination
of the underlying public policy considerations. 4
The public policy considerations supporting a continuing liability
of one spouse for the necessaries of the other is at least as strong as the
policy considerations in cases in which rights were extended. For ex-
ample, conscientious objector status was extended to include ethical
objectors in Welsh v. United States75 because elimination of the status
for all objectors would be contrary to the intent of the original exemp-
tion. A continuing liability would also be consistent with other deci-
sions where benefits were extended to families with dependent children
when a mother was unemployed,76 where income tax deductions for
dependents were extended to single men,7 7 and where a presumption
of economic dependence was extended to widowers.7 8 In the instant
situation, the extension of liability for necessaries to both spouses
would both correct the incongruity of holding spouses criminally but
not civilly liable for each other's support and further the policy that the
contracting spouse should not become a charge on the public treasury.
Preliminary legislative response to Condore consisted of the intro-
duction of bills in both the House and the Senate during the 1981 ses-
72. 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 343, 345 (1980).
73. Abrams, The Effects of Invalidating a Law on the Grounds of Equal Protection, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 45 (1980).
74. Id at 31. Another question to be considered is whether the decision rendering the
law unconstitutional should be applied retroactively. Factors to be weighed in-
clude "the purpose of the new ruling or of the constitutional principles at issue,
• ..the reasonableness and extent of reliance on the overturned law, and. . . the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rul-
ing." Id at 36.
75. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
76. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
77. Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906
(1973).
78. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 601 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1980) (presumption of
dependency extended to widowers as well as to widows for purposes of workmen's
compensation death benefits).
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sion of the General Assembly. The House bill proposed to amend
article 45, section 21 of the Married Women's Property Act to acknowl-
edge a corresponding duty of the wife to be liable for her husband's
necessaries or for debts which the husband may enter into on the credit
of the wife.79
The Senate bill advocated a secondary liability concept similar to
the holding of Jersey Shore. so However, the language of this bill would
not protect from liability a homemaking spouse whose contributions to
the marriage have been real but who has earned no income. This lan-
guage does not recognize, as does the dissent in Condore, that a pledge
of existent credit of the non-contracting spouse is fundamental to the
doctrine of necessaries.
Potentially inequitable results can be forestalled only by recogniz-
ing the dissent's view that the basis of the doctrine is that the credit of
the non-contracting spouse is pledged. This approach was partially
adopted during the 1982 session of the General Assembly by House
Bill 160, which provides:
(A) This article may not be construed to relieve the husband
from liability for the debts, contracts or engagements which
the wife may incur or enter into upon the credit of her hus-
band or as his agent or for necessaries for herself or for his or
their children. As to all such cases his liability shall be or
continue as at common law.
(B) This article may not be construed to relieve the wife
from liability for the debts, contracts, or engagements which
the husband may incur or enter into upon the credit of his
wife or as her agent or for necessaries for himself or for her or
their children. As to all such cases her liability shall be the
same as that of a husband or father at common law.81
However, the inclusion of the language "upon the credit of the spouse"
before "for necessaries" in both subsections of this bill would serve to
protect the homemaking spouse who earns no income on which to es-
tablish credit and thus provide a satisfactory resolution to the problem
created by the Condore decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complete abrogation of both the common law doctrine of
necessaries and the statute rendering the husband liable for the neces-
saries of the wife withdraws economic protection from homemaking or
79. H.D. 1866, Md. Gen. Assembly, 1981 Sess.
80. Senate Bill 1069 provides: "If the income or assets of a husband or wife are insuf-
ficient to meet the cost of necessaries, his or her spouse is liable for the debts,
contracts, or engagements which the husband or wife may incur or enter into for
necessaries for himself or herself, or their children." S. 1069, Md. Gen. Assembly,
1981 Sess.
81. H.D. 160, Md. Gen. Assembly, 1982 Sess.
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dependent spouses of either sex and thus constitutes a detriment to the
family unit. An appropriate legislative response would include the en-
actment of an amendment to the Married Women's Property Act which
adopts both the secondary liability concept and the recognition that the
necessaries doctrine is based on the assumption that the credit of the
non-contracting spouse is pledged. Such a law would serve the legiti-
mate governmental objective of protecting the unemployed, homemak-
ing spouse while completely satisfying the mandate of the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment.
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